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The article elaborates on the lack of objective guarantees of independence and 
impartiality in the existing system of investment treaty arbitration. This founds a case 
for an international investment court to replace the existing system. The argument 
proceeds in three steps: (1) investment treaty arbitration is uniquely a form of public 
law adjudication, constituted at the international level; (2) as constituted it does not 
satisfy standards of independence and impartiality in public law adjudication; and (3) 
various reasons that might be offered to justify this failing are unsatisfactory in light 
of the importance of these standards. For this reason, states should be encouraged to 
establish an international investment court in accordance with well-known principles 
of judicial decision-making. Above all, alternatives to the existing system should be 
measured against the criteria that typically apply in public law, especially the related 
principles of openness and independence. Absent these criteria being met, one does 
not have a system that depoliticizes disputes and subjects them to the rule of law, or 






This article presents a case for an international investment court. It is a case and not 
‘the case’ because the argument is presented relative to existing arrangements that use 
a treaty-based arbitration mechanism to resolve investment disputes between states 
and investors. The argument is also narrow in that it focuses on a central distinction 
between judges and arbitrators: the secure tenure of the former and the insecure 
tenure (case-by-case appointment) of the latter. This orientation of the argument 
leads by implication to the assertion that there is something wanting in terms of the 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators in the existing arrangements based on 
investment treaty arbitration. Given this, the present case is meant to respond to a 
critical flaw in an existing arrangement for international adjudication by elaborating 
upon an alternative. 
 
It should be made clear from the outset that apparent bias in investment treaty 
arbitration is just that: it is a reasonable suspicion of bias (not actual bias) arising from 
structural failings of arbitration when used to determine matters of public law. The 
critique of investment treaty arbitration should thus not be taken as a condemnation 
of anyone involved in investment arbitration; there are many jurists, lawyers, 
academics, and business people of skill and integrity who sit as arbitrators and whose 
reputation is not sullied by an objective critique of the structure of the system and, in 
particular, its lack of objective guarantees of independence and impartiality. The 
difficulty is that the current structure of investment treaty arbitration casts a pall over 
all awards, and all legal interpretations, that emerge from the system in spite of the 
experience, qualifications, integrity, etc of the arbitrators, for reasons quite unique to 
this system and not to others where arbitration is used. 
 
Ultimately it does not have to be this way. There are alternatives that are superior in 
their guarantees of impartiality and independence and that can be achieved without 
legal or intellectual acrobatics, with benefits for most if not all of the actors involved 
including states and their governments, including investors (except perhaps for those 
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investors for whom litigation is a business strategy in itself), and including other 
systems that rely properly on arbitration to resolve disputes, especially commercial 
arbitration. The clearest alternative to the present arrangement is to establish an 
international investment court. 
 
The broad outline of the argument presented here in favour of such a court is as 
follows. First, investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law adjudication in 
which the meaning of public law is resolved finally by adjudication. Second, for this 
reason, it should be evaluated according to standards that apply historically in public 
law. Third, the current system’s failure to satisfy these standards, especially security of 
tenure, calls for an institutional arrangement that does satisfy them. Lastly, various 
counter-arguments that have been offered or that might be offered in opposition to 
an international investment court, founded on the principle of security of tenure in 
public law adjudication, do not warrant maintaining investment treaty arbitration as 
an alternative to such a court. For this reason, states should be encouraged to 
establish an international investment court in accordance with well-known principles 
of judicial decision-making in public law. 
 
A  Underlying assumptions 
 
The case presented here borrows and elaborates on arguments presented elsewhere 
by the author1 and it remains grounded in the theoretical distinction between the use 
of arbitration to resolve regulatory disputes and its use to resolve commercial or 
other private disputes. There are powerful criticisms of public-private distinctions 
from various perspectives and the aim here is not to dismiss these, although in this 
paper the criticisms are not discussed in detail if at all. Rather, the aim here is to use 
the public-private distinction to elucidate specific differences in casting the major 
types of adjudication, while acknowledging the possibility that the distinction may 
                                                 
1 G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) ch 7 
especially. 
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leave gray areas or be simply inappropriate in some circumstances. Nevertheless, it is 
assumed that these limitations are not so pervasive or frequent in the present context 
as to defeat the underlying usefulness of the distinction. 
 
The public-private distinction rests in turn on a concept of the state as sovereign. 
This concept too has received some negative press of late. The argument here is again 
quite pragmatic in its orientation. It refers to sovereignty as an instrument for 
identifying and analyzing certain activities of states as activities that states alone are 
able to engage in; for example, the passage of general rules accepted as binding in 
society and ultimately enforceable by the state’s coercive power. Recognizing this 
uniqueness of the state as sovereign, arising from its role as the representative of a 
political group associated with a particular territory, is useful in that it helps to reveal 
the distinctiveness of the relationship between the state and those who are subjected 
to or affected by regulatory activity of the state. As a concept, sovereignty is a means 
of social ordering that is important (though of course not beyond challenge or doubt) 
and that has sufficient probative value here, it is suggested, to enable an elaboration 
of the sorts of disputes that arise between investors and states and how those 
disputes differ from disputes arising between parties that are equally capable of 
possessing legal rights and obligations. 
 
In particular, an important aspect of disputes arising between a sovereign state and a 
foreign investor is that they are one-sided in that the entity on one side, the state, has 
a different set of powers and obligations in law than the entity on the other side, the 
investor. In some respects the state will possess rights that private parties cannot hold 
such that the state will have powers that are specifically sovereign. In other respects 
the state may be bound by sovereign obligations that a private party cannot possess 
or that a private party is in a unique position legally to avoid or abbreviate (by for 
example declaring bankruptcy). Where a dispute between a state and a private party 
occurs in relation to the state’s exercise of these uniquely sovereign powers or its 
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assumption of uniquely sovereign obligations, the dispute is described here as a 
‘regulatory dispute’ and the adjudication of that dispute as a form of ‘public law 
adjudication’. 
 
Thus, for present purposes, the public-private distinction entails recognition of the 
state as an entity with unique characteristics and of this concept of the state as the 
basis for public law as a category of study, enabling (even if roughly or with doubt) a 
distinction between instances in which adjudication is used to resolve regulatory 
disputes and instance in which it is used to resolve disputes originating in a reciprocal 




1 Investment treaty arbitration as a form of public law adjudication 
 
In applying this conceptual framework to investment treaty arbitration, the author 
has argued elsewhere (and will again only summarize that argument here) that 
investment treaty arbitration is a public law system, uniquely constituted at the 
international level, which replicates the structure of judicial review in domestic public 
law to a greater degree than other forms of international adjudication. In this respect, 
there is a key conceptual difference between investment treaty arbitration on the one 
hand and international commercial arbitration or conventional inter-state adjudication 
in public international law on the other. Both latter forms of international 
adjudication – international commercial arbitration and inter-state adjudication – are 
used to resolve disputes arising from a reciprocal legal relationship between the 
parties; that is, in international commercial arbitration, between private parties (one of 
which may be a state, acting in a private capacity) and in public international law 
between states (both acting in a sovereign capacity). In both contexts, either disputing 
party is equally capable of bringing a claim and of possessing legal rights and 
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obligations; hence the underlying formal reciprocity. In the case of investment treaty 
arbitration, on the other hand, adjudication is used to resolve disputes arising 
between an individual and a state in relation to that state’s assertion of its unique 
authority to regulate. The disputes arise in the context of a regulatory, rather than a 
reciprocal, legal relationship defined as such by the idea that the state in some cases 
exercises authority that no private party can possess. 
 
For this reason, investment treaty arbitration is best analogized to judicial review in 
public law because it involves an adjudicative body having the competence to 
determine, in response to a claim by an individual, the legality of the use of sovereign 
authority, and to award a remedy for unlawful state conduct. Alternatively, it could be 
said that the adjudicative body issues a decision that has important consequences for 
the state, for the individual, and for others affected by what the decision means for 
the authority and conduct of the state, whether they are affected as taxpayers, 
employees, consumers, recipients of government programs, beneficiaries of 
regulation, and so on. 
 
The public law character of investment treaty arbitration can be highlighted by 
looking at some of the questions that arbitrators have been called upon to answer in 
claims under investment treaties. For instance, they have determined whether a state 
violated a legal standard in an investment treaty by its national legislature enacting 
legislation that re-valued the state’s official currency, by a judge of that state 
conducting a trial in a particular way, by its executive interpreting its tax laws or 
issuing a broadcasting license or determining an export quota. It is not necessary to 
examine the details of cases in which these questions arose or how they were 
resolved. The point is simply that, in terms of the legal questions at stake and the 
wider consequences for the community or society, these claims resemble the claims 
that are commonly resolved in the domestic sphere by way of constitutional or 
administrative law. That is, investment treaty arbitration is used to resolve regulatory 
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disputes between those who govern and those who are governed. It is not used to 
resolve disputes arising from contractual or other reciprocal legal relations between 
private parties, one of which might very well be a state, but a state that is acting in a 
non-sovereign capacity. 
 
The next step in the argument that investment treaty arbitration is a form of public 
law adjudication requires that it be distinguished from other instances where 
international adjudication is used to resolve claims involving the sovereign treatment 
of an individual by the state. Here, the uniqueness of investment treaty arbitration 
arises from its exceptional combination of five characteristics (which again are only 
summarized here). First, unlike in customary international law and the great majority 
of treaties, individuals are authorized to bring international claims against states in the 
context of the regulatory relationship, as opposed to a commercial relationship, with 
the respondent state. 
 
Second, the state’s consent to arbitration is prospective, unlike in the case of those 
international tribunals where individuals historically could bring claims, such as the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal or historical claims tribunals formed after the Second World 
War (tribunals whose competence was limited either to existing disputes or to 
disputes arising from a particular historical event, such as a war or revolution). 
 
Third, the primary remedy in investment treaty arbitration is a damages award against 
the state. As such, investment treaties establish a system of state liability in public law; 
indeed, they provide for damages awards against the state for acts of not only the 
domestic administration of the state but also its legislatures and its courts. The 
availability of this remedy distinguishes investment treaty arbitration from other 
forms of international adjudication that allow individual claims with the exception of 
a small number of international courts, including the European Court of Justice, the 
European Court of Human Rights, and with certain qualifications the Inter-American 
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Court of Human Rights. In public law, the damages award for past unlawful conduct 
of the state is a very significant remedy because of its implications both for the 
budgets of states and for governmental decision-making writ large. 
 
Fourth, unlike any other treaty, investment treaties often remove the duty of the 
individual to exhaust local remedies before an international claim can be brought. 
This is critical because it operates to eclipse the conventional role of the domestic 
legal system in mediating between the international and domestic spheres. Further, 
this removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies is entirely unique to investment 
treaty arbitration. It is perhaps the most important aspect of how investment treaty 
arbitration, unlike other forms of international adjudication, resembles so closely 
domestic public law. 
 
Fifth, unlike other decisions or awards in public law, investment treaty awards are 
enforceable in the courts of as many as 160 countries with limited opportunity for 
judicial review, in particular for errors of law or unreasonable choices made by the 
arbitrators (ie, other than jurisdictional errors or serious procedural impropriety). As a 
result, the arbitrators are authorized to interpret important questions of public law 
without the possibility of review or correction by a court, whether domestic or 
international. 
 
The combination of these elements distinguishes investment treaty arbitration from 
other forms of international adjudication. It is therefore accurate in my view to say 
that investment treaty arbitration is the closest the world has come to an international 
adjudicative body with compulsory jurisdiction over claims by individual against 
states in the regulatory sphere. That is, it is the closest we have come to an 
international constitutional or administrative court, if we understand such a body to 
be one that would allow individuals directly to initiate an adjudicative review of the 
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regulatory conduct of the state, and to obtain a binding determination of the legality 
of state conduct as well as a powerful remedy. 
 
But of course investment treaty arbitration is not a court at all. It is rather a system 
that relies on a private model of adjudication, arbitration, to resolve regulatory 
disputes arising from foreign ownership of assets. 
 
2 Independence and impartiality in public law adjudication 
 
The argument thus far has sought to identify investment treaty arbitration as a form 
of state-to-individual adjudication in the regulatory context and, in this respect, as 
something unlike international commercial arbitration or other forms of international 
adjudication in public international law. Accepting that investment treaty arbitration is 
a form of public law adjudication, it is appropriate to examine issues of independence 
and impartiality in the system against the relevant standards that apply in public law, 
and not in these other contexts of international adjudication. In doing so, one should 
begin with standards that normally apply to courts in public law. This is the focus of 
the second stage of the argument. 
 
Normally, in public law, the adjudicative review of the state as the ultimate legislature 
and regulator on behalf of its people is reserved for a distinct branch of government 
called courts. Why a distinct branch? The primary reason historically was to separate 
the judicial function, involving the interpretation and application of the law in specific 
cases, from other branches of government. To achieve this separation it was thought 
necessary to ensure certain guarantees of independence for the judge, including by 
appointing the judge for set term; barring his or her removal from office other than 
for cause; guaranteeing the judge’s salary; and ensuring certain guarantees of 
 10
administrative independence involving the control by a court of its docket, the 
assignment of judges to cases, and so on.2 
 
In the common law tradition, the security of tenure of judges is ‘an original principle 
in the basic customary law of the constitution’.3 It has well-established roots dating 
from England’s Act of Settlement 1701 which provided that judges could be removed 
no longer at the pleasure of the King, but only on the approval of both Houses of 
Parliament.4 This statute was an outcome of the Glorious Revolution, following the 
stands taken by Sir Edward Coke as Chief Justice to King James I and, in particular, 
his refusal to subject judicial decisions to overriding authority of the King (a stand for 
which he was dismissed by the King). The principle of security of tenure for judges of 
the realm, as enacted into law by the Act of Settlement, was in turn incorporated into 
the constitutions of the United States and other countries, including Canada, as a 
basis for separating the judicial function of the state from, especially, the executive 
function. 
 
In the US context, Alexander Hamilton spoke in the Federalist Papers of the 
incorporation of security of tenure in the American Constitution in these terms:5 
 
As liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have 
everything to fear from its union with either of the other departments; … 
[permanence in office] may therefore be regarded as an indispensable 
ingredient in its constitution, and, in great measure, as the citadel of the public 
justice and the public security. 
 
Hamilton wrote further of the ‘permanent tenure of judicial officers’ that ‘nothing 
will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be 
                                                 
2 NT Nemetz, ‘Comment’  in A Linden, ed, The Canadian Judiciary (Osgoode Hall Law School 1976) 
16-17. 
3 WR Lederman, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’ in A Linden, ed, The Canadian Judiciary 
(Osgoode Hall Law School 1976) 5. 
4 Lord Denning, ‘The Independence of the Judges’ (Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club of 
the University of Birmingham, 1949-50) 7-8. 
5 The Federalist Papers, no 78 (New American Library edn, 1961) 465-6. 
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essentially to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty’.6 Here, permanency of 
tenure concerned chiefly judges’ ‘duration in office, the provisions for their support, 
the precautions for their responsibility.’7 
 
The origins of judicial security of tenure thus lie in the separation of judicial power 
from that of the executive. Regarding this, it is important in today’s context not to 
limit oneself to domestic executive officials, but also to consider the prospect that 
international executives might likewise exercise power over international adjudicators 
in ways that call into question their independence and impartiality. Further, the power 
of private interests is also of concern, to the extent that such interests might also be 
in a position to wield inappropriate influence over the adjudicator or the adjudicative 
process in its determination of what the state is, what it is allowed to do in law, and 
what happens when the sovereign state is found to have done something unlawful. 
As Shimon Shetreet wrote in 1976:8 
 
Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom from 
interference by the executive or legislature in the exercise of the judicial 
function…. In modern times, with the steady growth of corporate giants, it is 
of utmost importance that the independence of the judiciary from business or 
corporate interests should also be secured. In short, independence of the 
judiciary implies not only that a judge be free from governmental and political 
pressure and political entanglement but also that he should be removed from 
financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to 
affect him in the exercise of his judicial function. 
 
i Perceived versus actual bias 
 
How do those principles of judicial decision-making apply to investment treaty 
arbitration? In the first place, it is important to clarify that our concern is not merely 
actual bias but also the perception of bias on the part of the individual adjudicator or 
                                                 
6 ibid, 469. 
7 ibid, 465. 
8 S Shetreet, Judges on Trial (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1976) 17-18. 
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adjudicative body. I draw attention to this only because it has been said that, without 
proof of actual bias or an actual conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator, there 
is no problem with the current system of investment treaty arbitration. To insist on 
proof actual bias, however, entails a diminished standard of impartiality and 
independence, not only in the context of public law, but also in other contexts where 
arbitration is commonly utilized to resolve disputes. For all forms of adjudication, if 
we consider this a process by which a neutral authority that is not under the sway of 
one of the dispute parties, one speaks in terms of the absence of any ‘apprehension’ 
of bias, or any ‘appearance’ or ‘suspicion’ or ‘danger’ of bias, in order simply to make 
the point is that the concern for fairness and justice goes beyond actual bias and is 
measurable in terms of perceptions, based either on an objective standard or on 
subjective views of the parties themselves. 
 
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales put it thus in the Locabail decision:9 
 
…. objections and applications based on what, in the case law, is called ‘actual 
bias’ are very rare, partly (as we trust) because the existence of actual bias is 
very rare, but partly for other reasons also. The proof of actual bias is very 
difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge 
about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common 
law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a 
real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually 
exists. 
 
So there are good reasons for not limiting the evaluation to proof of actual bias on 
the part of an adjudicator. First, it would be unreasonable to hold a party to a 
requirement to prove actual bias given the difficulties in doing so. Second, it would 
be unbecoming of the adjudicative process to require the adjudicator to testify in 
advance as to his or her state of mind, opinions, etc. Instead, one speaks of the 
perception of bias. In Lord Hewart’s famous formulation: ‘it is not merely of some 
importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, 
                                                 
9 Locabail v Bayfield Properties [2000] QB 451, 471-2. 
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but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’.10 Or, according to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, it is required ‘that the court or tribunal be reasonably 
perceived as independent’:11 
 
The reason for this additional requirement was that the guarantee of judicial 
independence has the goal not only of ensuring that justice is done in 
individual cases, but also of ensuring public confidence in the justice system.... 
 
Also according to the Supreme Court of Canada:12 
 
Without that confidence the system cannot command the respect and 
acceptance that are essential to its effective operation. It is, therefore, 
important that a tribunal should be perceived as independent, as well as 
impartial, and that the test for independence should include that perception. 
 
Now, in assessing whether there is a reasonable perception of independence, it is 
necessary to look for any indicators of possible bias or lack of independence that are 
specific to the individual adjudicator, whether judge or arbitrator. That is, is there a 
direct or indirect interest that raises a concern in light of the personal or professional 
connections of the individual adjudicator? Is there an attitudinal bias arising from 
what the adjudicator has written on matters relevant to the dispute before him or her? 
Has the adjudicator been involved in past in the dispute or the line of decision-
making in question? Or has some conduct of the individual such as antagonism 
toward a party during a hearing raised a perception of a predisposition as to the 
result? 
 
In the context of arbitration, these issues are often addressed in arbitrators’ codes of 
conduct or in the rules of arbitration, and they inform the sorts of arguments that 
one sees arising in investment treaty arbitrations where a state has challenged the 
appointment of an arbitrator on the basis of an apparent conflict of interest. Such 
                                                 
10 The King v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256, 259. 
11 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, [1997] 3 SCR 3, para 111-12. 
12 R v Valente, [1985] 2 SCR 673, para 22. 
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challenges have arisen from the role of the arbitrator as a counsel in other cases, from 
past advocacy of the arbitrator in matters related to the dispute at hand, from 
previous decisions of the arbitrator, and from statements made by the arbitrator at 
the hearing. 
 
For example, Poland challenged the appointment of former ICJ justice Steven 
Schwebel in the Eureko arbitration based on (1) his working relationship with the firm 
Sidney Austin whose lawyers were advancing a separate investment treaty arbitration 
against Poland and (2) his own role as counsel (via links to same firm) for an investor 
in an investment treaty arbitration against another state, Argentina, in the Vivendi case 
and the fact that his arguments in that case relied in part on decisions made by the 
Eureko tribunal of which he was a member. Argument (1) was rejected by the Belgian 
Court of First Instance, whose decision was upheld by the Belgian Court of Appeal, 
in its application of provisions under the Belgian Judicial Code that allow for a 
challenge to an arbitrator’s appointment when circumstance raise ‘legitimate doubts’ 
about his or her impartiality or independence. Argument (2) was also rejected by the 
Belgian Court of Appeal, although on the separate basis that the argument had not 
been raised by Poland before the Court of First Instance. The court also reportedly 
emphasized Mr. Schwebel’s professional integrity as outweighing his sensibility and 
the goals he pursues as counsel or the possibility that his work as counsel and his 
working relationships with other counsel might influence inappropriately the 
decisions he makes as an arbitrator.13 
 
Another example is Argentina’s challenge in the British Gas arbitration to the 
appointment of Professor van den Berg on the basis of his past participation in other 
tribunals that had reached different interpretations of Argentina’s arguments about 
                                                 
13 C Verbruggen, ‘Belgian Court Confirms Independence of Judge Schwebel’ International Arbitration 
Newsletter (11 February 2008); D Vis-Dunbar and LE Peterson, ‘Belgian Appeals Court rejects 
Poland’s challenge to Arbitrator in Eureko case’ Investment Treaty News (15 November 2007) 
www.investmenttreatynews.com. 
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the meaning of the state of necessity under its bilateral investment treaty with the US 
and in customary international law. This challenge was referred to the International 
Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, which rejected the 
challenge without providing reasons for its decision (as is the ICC’s practice). This 
decision is reportedly subject to a further challenge by Argentina in the Argentine 
courts, based in part on the ICC not having given reasons for its decision. Further, in 
the National Grid arbitration, Argentina challenged the appointment of an arbitrator, 
Dr Andres Rigo Sureda, as president of the tribunal on the basis that his then law 
firm had appointed Dr Guido Tawil as an arbitrator in an arbitration between Duke 
Energy and Peru, and that Dr Tawil served concurrently as counsel in two other 
investment treaty cases against Argentina over which Dr Rigo Sureda had presided. 
Thus, the concern was that Dr Sureda would be sitting in judgment of a client of Dr 
Tawil, while Dr Tawil was sitting in judgment of a client of Dr Riga Sureda’s law firm. 
This challenge was also rejected without reasons by the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration, which had been designated to hear the challenge by the appointing 
authority for the arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
 
There have been other challenges to the appointment of arbitrators. With one 
exception,14 they have not succeeded to my knowledge (although some are still 
pending) and it is not suggested here that any of them should have succeeded in any 
particular case. The point here is simply that this is an area of inquiry, applicable to 
courts and to arbitration tribunals, that concerns matters of perceived bias; the 
common question is whether there is some characteristic of the individual adjudicator 
that raises concerns. 
 
                                                 
14 Republic of Ghana v Telekom Malaysia Berhad (18 October 2004 and 5 November 2004, No HA/RK 
2004.667 and HA/RK 2004.788) (DC The Hague) (concluding that a party-nominated arbitrator in 
an investment arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules could not concurrently act as counsel to an 
unrelated party in an ICSID annulment proceeding that raised similar legal issues). 
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ii Objective guarantees of independence  
 
This concern for an absence of any unacceptable perception – keeping in mind of 
course that the threshold for what is acceptable and what is not will vary in different 
adjudicative contexts – is thus common to most if not all forms of adjudication. On 
the other hand, what one does not see in arbitration, but what one should see where 
adjudication is used finally to determine public law, is the existence of the objective 
guarantees of independence that normally apply to courts. One of these guarantees is 
security of tenure, but as mentioned there are others relating to the remuneration of 
judges, their administrative independence, the openness of judicial proceedings, and 
so on. They are what the Supreme Court of Canada has referred to as: ‘a set of 
“objective conditions or guarantees”... whose absence would lead to a finding that a 
tribunal or court was not independent. The existence of objective guarantees, of 
course, follows from the fact that independence is status oriented; the objective 
guarantees define that status.’15 
 
These objective guarantees are absent, obviously, from arbitration where the 
arbitrator is appointed on a case by case basis. Arbitrators who are appointed on a 
case by case basis by definition do not have security of tenure. But is this really a 
concern? If one holds investment treaty arbitration to the established standards of 
judicial independence and impartiality in public law then the answer is yes, because 
the absence of security of tenure leads to a reasonable judgment that the system is 
stacked, to put it crudely, in favour of investors and against host states. Undoubtedly, 
in any adjudicative system, parties on both sides will sometimes claim that they lost 
unjustifiably and that they did not get a fair hearing. However, uniquely in the case of 
the present system because of its use of arbitration in public law, a perception of bias 
does operate structurally in favour of investors and against states and those on whose 
behalf states act. 
                                                 
15 Reference re Remuneration, above n 11, para 112 (referencing Valente, above n 12, para 15 and 22). 
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There are two elements to this. The first has to do with the designation under 
investment treaties of appointing authorities for arbitrators. Without security of 
tenure for the adjudicator, the entity that has the ultimate power to appoint in each 
case, after a claim has been filed, has much greater ability to influence the adjudicative 
process than if it only appointed the adjudicator once and for a set term. In a case by 
case system, the appointing authority has the power to choose the presiding 
arbitrator, in the absence of agreement between the state and individual, after 
examining in each instance the dispute at hand, the nationality of the claimant, the 
identify of the host state, and so on. Under investment treaties, this power is allocated 
to decision-makers that cannot be said to be reasonably free from bias in favour of 
foreign investors or, on the other hand, states. Rather, the institutions in question 
lean heavily toward the capital-exporting perspective and, by extension, toward 
foreign investors and the major capital-exporting states. 
 
First, appointing authority is commonly exercised by the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes where appointing authority is exercised either by 
the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council or by the ICSID Secretary General. 
The former is an ex officio position of the President of the World Bank who is in turn 
nominated by the US government and confirmed by the Bank’s Board of Directors 
(where over 60% of the voting power is exercised by Executive Directors from 11 
major capital-exporting states); at present, this appointing authority is exercised by 
Robert Zoellick (formerly US Trade Representative); before that it was exercised by 
Paul Wolfowitz (formerly US Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2001-2005). Likewise, the 
ICSID Secretary General (customarily also the World Bank’s Legal VP and General 
Counsel, although this customary practice is now reportedly slated to change16) is a 
person nominated by the Chair of the Administrative Council and approved by a 
two-thirds vote of the Administrative Council. In both cases, then, appointing 
                                                 
16 ‘After 40+ years, ICSID to have its own full-time Secretary General’ Investment Arbitration Reporter 
(18 June 2008) www.iareporter.com. 
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authority is vested in an official who is customarily chosen by the US Administration 
with the concurrence of other major capital-exporting states. As such, the system is 
somewhat comparable to earlier arrangements in investment contracts between US 
firms and Caribbean or Central American states, where disputes arising under the 
contract between the US investor and the host government were subject to resolution 
by arbitration, with default authority to appoint the presiding arbitrator resting with 
the US Secretary of State.17 At ICSID, the role of the US Administration is one or 
two steps removed from this quasi-colonial set-up in that the US Administration 
nominates the World Bank President – subject to appointment by a process in which 
11 major capital-exporters hold a majority of the votes – who will then either exercise 
appointing authority or in turn select the ICSID Secretary General to do so. Given 
this structure, it seems reasonable for an informed observer to conclude that ICSID 
appointing authority will tend toward the position of the major capital-exporting 
states and their firms. Put differently, it is difficult to say that those who wield 
appointing authority at ICSID are free of a perception of bias in favour of investors, 
especially US investors. Indeed, some developing states have gone so far as to 
publicly challenged this proposition.18 
 
Even so, this arrangement would be less problematic if ICSID appointed individual 
adjudicators for a set term of, say, seven years; if the appointments were non-
renewable; if the adjudicators were chosen for particular cases in a neutral way, such 
as by lottery; and if the appointments process took place as part of a public process 
involving a discussion of potential candidates by different groups of states and an 
opportunity for capital-exporting and capital-importing states both to influence the 
final decision. There would need to be more say given to the capital-exporting 
perspective than country-by-country or population-based voting would allow, if the 
                                                 
17 RW Dunn, American Foreign Investments (New York: BW Huebsch and Viking Press, 1926) 357-8, 
368. 
18 F Cabrera Diaz, ‘Bolivia expounds on reasons for withdrawing from ICSID arbitration system’ 
Investment Treaty News (27 May 2007); G Molina, ‘Ecuador wary of World Bank arbitration in 
Occidental case’ The Washington Post (11 May 2008). 
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aim was to establish a system that had the confidence of investors. But it need not be 
a matter of control, as in the case of voting power among the World Bank’s 
Executive Directors. At the very least, the guarantee of secure tenure would remove 
the ongoing discretion that ICSID officials exercise over states on a claim-by-claim, 
government-by-government basis. 
 
Yet more troubling than the role of ICSID as appointing authority is the role under 
some investment treaties of business organizations that are accountable directly to 
investors and businesses. For example, some treaties (concluded mainly between 
European states and developing states) assign appointing authority to the 
International Chamber of Commerce (others assign it to the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce). Under the ICC Rules, arbitrators are appointed by the ICC’s 
International Court of Arbitration, the members of which are nominated by the ICC 
world council of business on the recommendation of the ICC Executive Board.19 On 
its website, the ICC describes itself as ‘the world business organization’, as ‘the voice 
of world business’, and as an organization that ‘speaks for world business whenever 
governments make decisions that crucially affect corporate strategies and the bottom 
line’. This conveys simply the point that the ICC is an association of businesses that 
represents the interests of its members, many of whom are foreign investors, and that 
can therefore be reasonably regarded as disposed more toward the business interests 
of investors than the regulatory priorities of states. 
 
Indeed, it seems far-fetched to suggest that a business organization (or an 
adjudicative body the members of which are appointed by a business organization) 
can serve as a neutral appointing authority, where it has the authority to appoint 
arbitrators to resolve regulatory disputes between states and business. It is doubtful 
that such an arrangement would ever be accepted in a domestic context. Can one 
imagine a claim of ‘unfair regulation’, brought by a company, being submitted for 
                                                 
19 Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, revised 1 January 1998, art 1 and 9(3)) and 
app I (Statute of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, art 3). 
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resolution by an ad hoc tribunal, the president of which was appointed by the local 
chamber of commerce? Not if one expected the claim to be resolved in a way that 
was regarded as credible by outsiders. Such an arrangement would appear rather as 
one meant to favour the business interest at the expense of genuine independence 
and impartiality. 
 
The second element of this question of impartiality and independence – beyond the 
role of the appointing authority – is that security of tenure also insulates the 
adjudicator from influence by powerful private interests, so as to ensure that no one 
can say that the judge was predisposed to decide a case or interpreted the law in a way 
that would increase his or her prospects for future income and career advancement. 
Here it can be said (even where it is not the case) that arbitrators may be seen to 
interpret the treaties in ways that encourage claims by investors and, in turn, allows 
the relevant arbitration industry to thrive. That concern is unique to investment treaty 
arbitration, where the private model of arbitration is imported into the realm of 
public law, because only one class of parties (here the investor) activates the system 
by bringing a claim under the treaty. 
 
WR Lederman wrote in 1976 that with the security of tenure of judges, ‘The 
conditions on which they hold office mean that they have no personal career interest 
to be served by the way they go in deciding cases that come before them.’20 This 
removal of the career interest from the adjudicative equation is defeated when one 
assigns appointing authority on a case by case basis to executive officials; in the 
words of Lord Denning, without security of tenure, ‘The judicial power is simply a 
part of the executive machine’.21 It is likewise defeated when security of tenure is 
removed in a one-way system in which only one class of disputing parties triggers use 
of the system. 
 
                                                 
20 Lederman, above n 3, 11. 
21 Denning, above n 4, 1. 
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Thus, to retrace our steps, the underlying distinction between regulatory and 
reciprocal legal relationships is important because it suggests that public law disputes, 
and especially matters of law arising from such disputes, should not be left ultimately 
to arbitrators to resolve. Rather, they should be subject to the overarching authority 
of public courts, defined among other things by their presumptive openness and by 
objective guarantees of their independence and impartiality, in order to guard against 
the suspicion that the adjudicator has been swayed in their judgments by the power 
that others hold over his or her income and career. The argument is grounded in the 
importance of security of tenure to the evolution of an adjudicative system that can 
earn the utmost respect by all those whose rights or interests are engaged, above all 
those who are directly subject to its authority and who may be affected detrimentally 
by its outcomes. 
 
3 Reply to counter-arguments 
 
Certain counter-arguments have been advanced, and others may be anticipated, to 
this case for an international investment court. Most commonly in my experience it 
has been argued that there is no proof of actual bias in investment treaty arbitration 
and therefore no problem with the current system. Absent evidence or some case of 
actual bias, it is said, the requirements of independence and impartiality are satisfied. 
This counter-argument rests on a misconception not only of the standards of 
independence and impartiality that apply to judging in public law, but also of those 
that apply in other adjudicative contexts, including commercial arbitration.22 As 
discussed above, it is not usually a requirement in adjudication that actual bias be 
shown in order to disqualify an adjudicator from a particular case (although proof of 
                                                 
22 eg IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (22 May 2004), explanation 
to General Standard 1 (referring to ‘justifiable doubts’ as to the arbitrator’s ‘ability to be impartial or 
independent’). 
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actual bias will of course suffice to disqualify). What is required is a showing of some 
reason for why the adjudicator may be reasonably perceived to lack independence 
and impartiality, even though he or she may well be capable of resolving the case in 
an independent way. Where one draws the line as to what perceptions constitute a 
sufficient reason to disqualify the adjudicator or adjudicative arrangement will vary 
according to the role and purpose of the adjudication. But only a very limited (and 
probably unfair) system of adjudication would insist on proof of actual bias as the 
sole check against impartiality and lack of independence. 
 
Alternatively, it has been argued in response to this case for an international 
investment court that security of tenure is unimportant, ‘artificial’, or at least not 
central to ensuring impartiality and independence in public law adjudication. One 
who has great trust in the integrity of individual arbitrators may well hold this belief, 
and understandably. But not everyone is in a position to know enough about the 
integrity of the individual adjudicator in one case or another to be assured that his or 
her reputation is beyond doubt, especially when one learns of the business interest 
that inevitably arises where an adjudicator lacks secure tenure and can obtain 
appointment only case-by-case. This is why objective guarantees become so 
important. It should also be emphasized that those who dismiss security of tenure as 
a source of judicial independence are implicitly rejecting a long history of developed 
wisdom on the issue, and should be called on to elaborate clear arguments to explain 
why the inherited position is no longer thought important or relevant in investment 
treaty arbitration. No one has done so to my knowledge. The author prefers therefore 
to ride the coattails of Alexander Hamilton and company, and defend judicial security 
of tenure. 
 
One might alternatively concede that standards of independence and impartiality 
normally present in public law are diluted in investment treaty arbitration, but that 
this is appropriate for some reason. For example, it might be said that the fact that 
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investment disputes exist on the international plane makes it somehow inappropriate 
or unfeasible to import domestic ideals of judicial independence into that vaunted 
realm. States would never agree to it, one might lament, and investment treaty 
arbitration is the next-best alternative to the imperfections of domestic courts. 
 
There are two problems with this counter-argument. The first is that states have 
regularly given tenure to international adjudicators in both state-state disputes23 and 
(however rare) individual-state disputes.24 They have also managed in many cases to 
appoint highly reputed individuals as jurists to the relevant adjudicative bodies. Why 
not encourage states to do the same in the present context of international 
investment disputes? Second, the argument falters perhaps in its preference for 
international arbitration over domestic courts if one accepts that the latter are in 
certain respects more capable than the former to deliver fair and legitimate decisions 
in the resolution of claims by foreign investors against host states. To adopt the 
presumption, as do many investment treaties by removing the duty to exhaust local 
remedies, that host state courts should be dismissed as simply incapable of delivering 
justice to foreign investors fails to account for claims brought against states like 
Canada and the United States, whose judiciaries have a status of constitutionalized 
independence that is much superior to that of international arbitrators. Further, it 
does not retain a space into which a state that successfully strengthens the capacity 
and independence (including by ensuring security of tenure and other objective 
guarantees) of its courts, as part of the state’s democratic progress or transition, may 
position itself. 
 
A more hopeful and in some cases more defensible option would be to adopt the 
presumption, as does customary international law, that local courts offer justice and 
                                                 
23 eg International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Appellate Body of 
the World Trade Organization. 
24 eg European Court of Justice, European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, International Criminal Court, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
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to require the foreign investor to show otherwise as a precondition of an investment 
treaty claim (or perhaps to reverse the presumption by at least allowing the host state 
to defend itself against a treaty claim by establishing the independence of its courts). 
Where the duty to exhaust local remedies is removed, the preference for international 
arbitration operates not only as a mechanism to address failings of domestic courts 
but also as a means to privilege foreign investors by allowing them to evade judicial 
authority in public law, no matter how independent and capable of delivering justice 
the courts may be. Lastly, even if the duty to exhaust local remedies is removed, the 
more appropriate alternative to domestic courts – if one’s aim is to limit political 
control over the resolution of investment disputes and subject them instead to the 
rule of law – is patently an international investment court, not a system based on 
case-by-case adjudicative appointment by executive or private business officials in a 
regulatory context that encourages arbitrators to adopt interpretations in favour of 
investors so as to encourage future claims. 
 
Another counter-argument might be to point to administrative or quasi-judicial 
tribunals at the domestic level that are staffed by adjudicators who do not have secure 
tenure, but that resolve claims brought by individuals against the state in response to 
legislative or executive decisions. In domestic administrative law, it is sometimes said 
that judicial standards of independence must be moderated in order to facilitate the 
fair and expeditious adjudication of disputes about individual interests in the modern 
administrative state. That is, the state is simply so vast and complex that the 
machinery of government would seize up if all governmental decisions that affected 
an individual were subject to review by a fully independent court. 
 
The author should confess that he is one who tends to emphasize the importance of 
maintaining conventional standards of judicial independence as much as possible, and 
of funding the courts accordingly, when dealing with even highly specific decisions of 
governments that affect an individual in a particularized way. Yet there is no need to 
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invoke Dicey in order to distinguish the context of domestic tribunals in the modern 
administrative state from that of investment treaty arbitration. First, with the latter, 
one is not confronted with a flood of disputes that would overload the capacity of an 
international court. At present, the rate of claims brought under investment treaties is 
stable at a few dozen a year. It is not a case of the hundreds or thousands (or tens of 
thousands) of claims annually that domestic tribunals are often established to deal 
with. Also, states can surely afford the financial cost of an adjudicative body that 
satisfies judicial standards, or work creatively toward a funding mechanism that 
requires financial contributions by the disputing parties if that is thought prudent. 
Presumably, the priority is not to save several tens of millions of dollars a year, but to 
establish a system that is widely regarded as fair and independent, in the longer term 
interest of the system and those whom it seeks to protect. 
 
Second, one is not dealing in investment treaty arbitration with the sorts of questions 
that are allocated to administrative tribunals in domestic law. The disputes at stake do 
not involve the removal of a liquor license or the disciplining of a lawyer or a doctor. 
Rather, they very often address the legality of legislative acts or broad policy decisions 
of government, leading to the potential re-allocation of substantial public funds to 
private business. These questions are of a different order of significance from those 
usually resolved by domestic tribunals. It is also noteworthy that domestic tribunals, 
even when they handle large numbers of claims, are often staffed by members who 
have a set tenure and who are not assigned on a case-by-case basis at the pleasure of 
the executive. As such, the standard of independence and impartiality that is offered 
by many domestic tribunals, although they deal with less weighty matters, surpasses 
that of investment treaty tribunals. 
 
Third, and most importantly, where a decision of a domestic tribunal does engage 
important questions of general law, the decision can be appealed to an independent 
court. This is not the case in investment treaty arbitration, where questions of law 
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decided by arbitrators are not subject to review in a court, whether domestic or 
international, to assure their correctness or reasonableness. 
 
There are of course other possible counter-arguments. One might argue that, if 
adjudicators under investment treaties were required to commit to a lengthy term of 
service, states would not be able to attract those with the desired experience or 
expertise. This is not a flippant objection and one should not underestimate the 
challenge of identifying the best possible candidates for such an important role as 
membership on an international investment court. However, considering the 
willingness of many prominent judges, practitioners, academics, and officials to 
accept appointments as arbitrators in the present system, it seems doubtful that one 
would face a shortage of highly qualified persons who were willing to serve, even if it 
required them to relinquish income or career opportunities elsewhere. Some would 
no doubt decline the opportunity for very understandable reasons, but there would 
likely be others to take their place, and they should at least be invited to step forward. 
Finally, the system might benefit from widening the pool of recruitment by drawing 
on persons with experience and expertise in fields of law and policy beyond those of 
international investment or commerce, in light of the breadth of issues that may be 
generated by regulatory disputes between business and state. 
 
Another counter-argument might be that the parties should be permitted to choose 
an adjudicator or adjudicative process that they believe will better serve to deal with 
disputes between them. That is a compelling argument in many contexts where 
arbitration is used, as in commercial arbitration, labour arbitration, and perhaps 
family arbitration. But in the case of investment treaty arbitration it runs into the first 
stage of the case presented here. Regulatory disputes between states and investors  
are not disputes between juridical equals. They are a matter of public law, where the 
fictional behemoth of the sovereign state has myriad relations with all private parties 
within its jurisdiction and affected by its governing choices, and where it is up to the 
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institutions of the state to decide on the forms of decision-making and adjudication 
that will be made accessible to individuals who wish to challenge the sovereign. In 
this context, it is more accurate to say that the state (or states, by treaty) authorized a 
particular form of dispute settlement that the individual subsequently opts to take 
advantage of, as where a person brings a claim against the state under a domestic 
statute or constitution. To reduce such arrangements for public law adjudication to 
the conceptual framework of a consensual agreement between disputing parties – 
given the singular and over-arching role of the state’s decision to establish the 
arrangements as a means to govern the state’s regulatory authority – is artificial. 
 
Along the same lines, it was recently put to the author, following a conference 
presentation, that ICSID plays a limited role as an appointing authority because it 
appoints the presiding arbitrator in just 3% of cases. I confess to not knowing the 
frequency of actual appointments as a proportion of potential appointments by 
ICSID. It is firstly not a straightforward figure to calculate. Does one measure ICSID 
appointments as a proportion of all presiding arbitrators who take part in arbitrations 
that are subject to ICSID appointing authority, for example? Or does one measure 
ICSID appointments as a proportion of all appointments in such arbitrations, 
including appointments of the party-appointed arbitrators? A further complication is 
that awards do not always indicate in the text whether the presiding arbitrator was 
appointed by ICSID in the exercise of its compulsory power, or by some other 
means. 
 
However, the author tested the figure of 3% in a preliminary way by reviewing 
investment treaty awards, decided before 1 September 2006, on which the relevant 
data was at hand (ie a statement in the award indicating who appointed the presiding 
arbitrator). This yielded these results. Of 26 cases reviewed,25 16 were pursuant to the 
                                                 
25 Cases pursuant to ICSID Rules: LESI v Algeria (co-arbitrators appointed president); Lanco v 
Argentina (SG ICSID appointed president with agreement of parties); Aguas del Aconguija & Vivendi v 
Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); Enron v Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); 
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ICSID Rules, and ICSID appointed the presiding arbitrator in 69% of those cases. 
The other 10 cases were pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, and the designated 
appointing authority (ICSID in 9 of the 10 cases; Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
in the remaining case) appointed the presiding arbitrator in 40% of those cases. Thus, 
even adopting assumptions that understate the role of the appointing authority – by 
excluding annulment committees (as did the author in gathering the 26 cases), by 
including party-appointed arbitrators in the calculation, and by assuming that all 
party-appointed arbitrators were in fact appointed by the relevant party although in 
fact they were in a few cases appointed by the appointing authority – then the result 
is that ICSID appointed 23% of total arbitrators in ICSID cases, and the designated 
appointing authority appointed 19% in ICSID and UNCITRAL cases combined. On 
these assumptions and preliminary findings, the figure of 3% appears a significant 
underestimate. 
 
Regardless of the frequency of ICSID appointments, a more important point is that 
the power of an organization to appoint arbitrators goes beyond the actual exercise of 
that appointing authority. Negotiations between the disputing parties about who they 
should agree to appoint as president of a tribunal are shaped by their estimation of 
how the designated authority will exercise its power to appoint if called upon to do 
so. The appointing authority also normally has the power to resolve claims that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
CMS v Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); LG&E v Argentina (SG ICSID appointed 
president with agreement of parties); Siemens v Argentina (Acting SG ICSID appointed president); 
Sempra v Argentina (Acting SG ICSID appointed president); AES v Argentina (SG ICSID appointed 
president); Continental Casualty v Argentina (Chair of AC appointed president); Gas Natural v Argentina 
(Chair of AC appointed president); Plama v Bulgaria (Chair of AC appointed president); Goetz v 
Burundi (Chair of AC appointed president); Casado v Chile (Chair of AC appointed president); MTD 
Equity v Chile (by agreement); Champion Trading v Egypt (SG ICSID appointed president with 
agreement of parties). Cases pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules: Ethyl v Canada (ICSID appointed 
president); Pope & Talbot v Canada (SG ICSID appointed president); SD Myers v Canada (by 
agreement); Lauder v Czech Republic (by agreement); Saluka v Czech Republic (by agreement of co-
arbitrators); Swembalt v Latvia (by agreement of co-arbitrators, one party-appointed arbitrator 
appointed by SCC Institute on nomination as appointing authority by SG PCA); International 
Thunderbird v Mexico (SG ICSID appointed president); Link Trading v Moldova (SCC Institute appointed 
president and one party-appointed arbitrator on nomination as appointing authority by SG PCA); 
Canfor v US (initial panel by agreement); Consolidated Softwood Lumber v US (SG ICSID appointed all 
three members). 
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particular arbitrator has a conflict of interest or is otherwise impartial, and ICSID 
itself appoints all three members of ICSID annulment committees. 
 
It is thus not convincing to argue that investment treaty arbitrators do not require 
security of tenure because the disputing parties often reach agreement on who should 
be appointed as presiding arbitrator. Such agreements are reached against the 
backdrop of the parties’ perceptions of the probable predilections of those who the 
appointing authority would otherwise likely appoint. Indeed, if the role of the 
appointing authority was inconsequential, why is such care taken by the major states 
to ensure that their treaties assign appointing authority to organizations whose voting 
power is dominated by capital-exporting states or by international business? Lastly, it 
is indicative of the broader argument that a similar apprehension of perceived bias 
has been expressed by representatives of Western firms concerned about the role of 
the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission as appointing 
authority in contract-based arbitrations between foreign firms and state-owned 
companies in China.26 
 
A final argument might be to plead a fait d’accompli by arguing that states have made 
the choice to use arbitration in this manner, and that is it. This is a profoundly 
powerful case where the objective is to interpret and apply the law as it stands. There 
may be constitutional limits to the delegation of judicial power to private arbitrators 
in some states, and the fact that states have resorted to arbitration to resolve public 
law may have implications for the system more broadly, perhaps in terms of the 
recognition and enforcement of awards. But there can be little, if any, doubt that the 
states parties to investment treaties intended to allow arbitrators who do not have 
secure tenure to resolve the relevant disputes. Nevertheless, this does nothing to 
undermine the argument presented here given that its object is to explain why states 
should not have made, and should not continue to make, this choice. The existing 
                                                 
26 A Batson, ‘Concerns about China arbitration rise’ Wall Street Journal (9 May 2008). 
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arrangement does not satisfy standards of judicial impartiality and independence; this 
inadequacy can be addressed by establishing an adjudicative body that satisfies those 
standards. It is quite clear at this stage what states did; the point is they got it wrong. 
 
Some of these counter-arguments (and there are no doubt others not canvassed here) 
are more compelling than others, but none warrants abandonment of the case for an 
international investment court. None explains in particular why it is preferable to use 
arbitration to resolve investment disputes rather than to ensure the utmost integrity 
of adjudicative decision-making in the regulatory domain by incorporating objective 




The skeletal argument presented here is (1) that investment treaty arbitration is a 
form of public law adjudication, (2) that it fails to satisfy standards of independence 
and impartiality in public law, and (3) that various reasons that might be offered to 
justify this are unsatisfactory in light of the importance of these standards. The next 
step is to ask: what sort of international investment court is required and how best 
should one seek to establish it? There are many possibilities and opportunities. An 
international investment court could be multilateral, regional, or bilateral. It could be 
a full court or an appellate body court that would hear appeals from decisions made 
in the first instance by arbitrators. It could be an autonomous entity or housed within 
existing institutions. It could be staffed by dedicated judges or via a roster of jurists 
who sit on domestic courts. Ultimately, it is not so important to arrive at a specific 
design for an international investment court that suits all states or all commentators. 
Much more important is to recognize that the present system is flawed and call upon 
states to address this flaw. Ideally, states will act jointly to do so but to the extent that 
cooperation proves elusive, like-minded states should not hesitate to pursue 
alternatives to investment treaty arbitration with respect to their own treaty networks. 
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The critical point is that alternatives should be measured against the criteria of 
judging in public law, especially the related concepts of openness and independence. 
Without these standards being met, one does not have a system that depoliticizes 
disputes and subjects them to the rule of law, or that deserves the respect of all 
interested parties, above all developing states. At present, when Argentina or Ecuador 
or the Czech Republic is unsuccessful in an investment treaty arbitration, its 
government and people have justifiable reason to reject the result as unfair, the 
process as structured unfairly against the host state, and the award as inferior in 
legitimacy to that of a court decision. 
 
There is clearly an important role for arbitration in contexts outside of public law, 
where the concerns elaborated here are much less pertinent. There is also a need for 
international adjudication to address concerns arising from domestic regulation of 
foreign investment in a global economy and the threat of arbitrary or discriminatory 
treatment by host governments. In this respect, it would be beneficial for investors in 
general, as well as states, to establish a system that is widely regarded to be free of 
perceived bias. And regardless of one’s views about whether there is a sufficient basis 
for doubts about the integrity of decisions emanating from the current system, why 
risk the possibility of many believing this to be the case? There is a clear alternative 
that is achievable, with awareness and political will, and states should be encouraged 
to pursue it. 
 
Lastly it is important to reiterate that the argument here is not an indictment of 
individual arbitrators. It is more an indictment of those public decision-makers who 
have chosen to rely on arbitration in matters of public law. Many arbitrators are 
justifiably admired for their integrity. But it is not enough to rely on the personal 
reputation of arbitrators when adjudicating public law. As Lord Prosser explained in a 
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decision of the English High Court27 that dealt with the appointment of temporary 
sheriffs in Scotland by ministerial officials and whether this met the guarantee in the 
European Convention on Human Rights of the right to a fair hearing before an 
‘independent and impartial tribunal established by law’: 
 
I am not suggesting in any way that there has ever been any impropriety, either 
on the part of temporary sheriffs or on the part of any holder of any 
ministerial office, or of their officials. But I would add that if a judge is not 
independent, then however great his integrity, it may be very difficult for him 
to know whether his want of independence affects the way in which he carries 
out his judicial duties. And however determined a minister or public servant 
may be to carry out his functions in relation to the judiciary only on the basis 
of wholly appropriate considerations, it will be important for him to 
remember that his own confidence in his own integrity is not, and cannot be 
regarded as, a guarantee.  
 
It is with the same sentiment that a case for an international investment court is laid 
out here. 
                                                 
27 Starr v Ruxtom [2000] JC 208, 234 (also cited by Lord Bingham for the Privy Council in Millar v 
Dickson [2001] UKPC D4). 
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APPOINTMENT AND TENURE OF ADJUDICATORS 
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ECHR Art 22(1): 
‘The judges shall be 
elected by the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly with 
respect to each 
High Contracting 
Party with by a 
majority of votes 
cast from a list of 
three candidates 
nominated by the 
High Contracting 
Party.’ 
ECHR Art 21(1): 
‘The judges shall be 
of high moral 
character and must 




high judicial office 




ECHR Art 23 (1): 
‘The judges shall be 
elected for a period 
of six years….’ 
 
ECHR Art 23(6): 
‘The terms of 
office of judges 
shall expire when 
they reach the age 
of 70.’ 
 
ECHR Art 24: ‘No 
judge may be 
dismissed from his 
office unless the 
other judges decide 
by a majority of 
two-thirds that he 
has ceased to fulfill 
the required 
conditions.’ 
ECHR Art 21(3): ‘During 
their term of office the 
judges shall not engage in 
any activity which is 
incompatible with their 
independence, impartiality 
or with the demands of a 
full-time office; all questions 
arising from the application 
of this paragraph shall be 
decided by the Court.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
4: ‘In accordance with 
Article 21(3) of the 
Convention, the judges shall 
not during their term of 
office engage in any political 
or administrative activity or 
any professional activity 
which is incompatible with 
their independence or 
impartiality or with the 
demands of a full-time 
office. Each judge shall 
declare to the President of 
the Court any additional 
activity. In the event of a 
disagreement between the 
President and the judge 
concerned, any question 
arising shall be decided by 
the plenary Court.’ 
ECHR Art 23(1): 
‘The judges shall be 
elected for a period 
of six years. They 
may be re-
elected….’ 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
13: ‘Judges of the Court 
may not preside in cases in 
which the Contracting Party 
of which they are nationals 
or in respect of which they 
were elected is a party.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
24(2)(a): ‘The Grand 
Chamber shall include the 
President and the Vice-
Presidents of the court and 
the Presidents of the 
Sections….’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
24(2)(e): ‘The judges and 
substitute judges who are to 
complete the Grand 
Chamber in each case 
referred to it shall be 
designated from among the 
remaining judges by a 
drawing of lots by the 
President of the Court in 
the presence of the 
Registrar. The modalities 
for the drawing of lots shall 
be laid down by the Plenary 
Court, having due regard to 
the need for a 
geographically balanced 
composition reflected the 
different legal systems 
among the Contracting 
Parties.’ 
 
ECHR Art 21(2): ‘The judges 
shall sit on the Court in their 
individual capacity.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 3(1): 
‘Before taking up office, each 
elected judge shall… take the 
following oath or make the 
following solemn declaration: “I 
swear… that I will exercise my 
functions as a judge honourably, 
independently, and impartially 
and that I will keep secret all 
deliberations.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 28(2): 
‘A judge may not take part in the 
consideration of any case in 
which he or she has a personal 
interest or has previously acted 
either as the Agent, advocate or 
adviser of a party or of a person 
having an interest in the case, or 
as a member of a tribunal or 
commission of inquiry, or in any 
other capacity.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 28(4): 
‘If the President of the Chamber 
considers that a reason exists for 
a judge to withdraw, he or she 
shall consult with the judge 
concerned; in the event of 
disagreement, the Chamber shall 
decide.’ 
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Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
25(1): ‘The Chambers 
provided for in Article 26(b) 
of the Convention (referred 
to in these Rules as 
“Sections”) shall be set up 
by the plenary Court, on a 
proposal by its President, 
for a period of three 
years….’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
25(2): ‘Each judge shall be a 
member of a Section. The 
composition of the Sections 
shall be geographically and 
gender balanced and shall 
reflect the different legal 
systems among the 
Contracting Parties.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
26(1): ‘…. (a) … the 
Chambers shall in each case 
include the President of the 
Section and the judge 
elected in respect of any 
Contracting Party 
concerned…. (b) The other 
members of the Chamber 
shall be designated by the 
President of the Section in 
rotation from among the 
members of the relevant 
Section.’ 
 
Rules of the ECtHR, Rule 
27: ‘1. Committees 
composed of three judges 
belonging to the same 
Section shall be set up…. 
After consulting the 
Presidents of the Sections, 
the President of the Court 
shall decide on the number 
of Committees to set up. 2. 
The Committees shall be 
 3
constituted for a period of 
twelve months by rotation 
among the members of 
each Section, excepting the 







security of tenure 
Qualities of tenure Eligibility for re-
appointment 
Method of appointment 




Justice – one 
judge per 
Member State 
(EU Treaty Art 
221) 
EU Treaty Art 223: 
‘…. They shall be 
appointed by 
common accord of 
the governments of 
the Member 
States….’ 
EU Treaty Art 223: 
‘The Judges… of 
the Court of Justice 




beyond doubt and 
who possess the 
qualifications 
required for 
appointment to the 
highest judicial 
offices in their 
respective 
countries or who 
are jurisconsults of 
recognised 
competence….’ 
EU Treaty Art 223: 
‘… they shall be 
appointed by 
common accord of 
the governments of 
the Member States 
for a term of six 
years.’ 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 4: 
‘The Judges may not hold 
any political or 
administrative office. They 
may not engage in any 
occupation, whether gainful 
or not, unless exemption is 
exceptionally granted by the 
Council. When taking up 
their duties, they shall give a 
solemn undertaking that, 
both during and after their 
term of office, they will 
respect the obligations 
arising therefrom, in 
particular the duty to 
behave with integrity and 
discretion as regards the 
acceptance, after they have 
ceased to hold office, of 
certain appointments or 
benefits. Any doubt on this 
point shall be settled by 
decision of the Court.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the 
ECJ Art 5: ‘Members who 
wish to take part in an 
external activity shall 
request prior authorisation 
from the Court or Tribunal 
of which they are a 
Member. They shall 
undertake, however, to 
comply with their obligation 
to be available so as to 
devote themselves fully to 
the performance of their 
duties.’ 




Rules of Procedure of the 
ECJ, Art 6: ‘Judges… shall 
rank equally in precedent 
according to their seniority 
in office. Where there is 
equal seniority in office, 
precedence shall be 
determined by age.’ 
 
Rules of Procedure of the 
ECJ, Art 11b(1): ‘For each 
case the Grand Chamber 
shall be composed of the 
President of the Court, the 
Presidents of the Chambers 
of five Judges, the Judge-
Rapporteur and the number 
of Judges necessary to reach 
13. The last mentioned 
Judges shall be designated 
from the list referred to in 
paragraph 2, following the 
order laid down therein….’ 
 
Rules of Procedure of the 
ECJ, Art 11b(2): ‘… a list of 
the other Judges shall be 
drawn up for the purposes 
of determining the 
composition of the Grand 
Chamber. That list shall 
follow the order laid down 
in Article 6 of these Rules, 
alternating with the reverse 
order….’ 
 
Rules of Procedure of the 
ECJ, Art 11c(2): ‘For the 
composition of the 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 2: ‘Before 
taking up his duties each Judge 
shall, in open court, take an oath 
to perform his duties impartially 
and conscientiously and to 
preserve the secrecy of all the 
deliberations of the Court.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 6: ‘A 
Judge may be deprived of his 
office or of his right to a pension 
or other benefits in its stead only 
if, in the unanimous opinion of 
the Judges and Advocates 
General of the Court, he no 
longer fulfils the requisite 
conditions or meets the 
obligations arising from his office. 
The Judge concerned shall not 
take part in any such 
deliberations.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 15: ‘The 
Court shall remain permanently in 
session. The duration of the 
judicial vacations shall be 
determined by the Court with due 
regard to the needs of its 
business.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 18: ‘No 
Judge or Advocate General may 
take part in the disposal of any 
case in which he has previously 
taken part as agent or adviser or 
has acted for one of the parties, 
or in which he has been called 
upon to pronounce as a member 
of a court or tribunal, of a 
 4
Chambers of five Judges… 
those lists shall be drawn up 
including all the Judges to 
the Chamber concerned…. 
in the same way as the list 
referred to in Article 11b(2). 
For the composition of the 
Chambers of three 
Judges… those Chamber 
lists shall be drawn up 
including all the Judges 
attached to the Chamber 
concerned…. The lists shall 
be drawn up according to 
the order laid down in 
Article 6 of these Rules.’  
commission of inquiry or in any 
other capacity….. If, for some 
special reason, the President 
considers that any Judge or 
Advocate General should not sit 
or make submissions in a 
particular case, he shall notify him 
accordingly. Any difficulty arising 
as to the application of this 
Article shall be settled by decision 
of the Court.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art 
3: ‘Members shall not accept gifts 
of any kind which might call into 
question their independence.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art 
3: ‘Members shall avoid any 
situation which may give rise to a 
conflict of interest.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art 
6: ‘…. Members shall 
undertake…. that, for a period of 
three years from the date of their 
ceasing to hold office, they will 
not act – as representatives of 
parties, in either written or oral 







security of tenure 
Qualities of tenure Eligibility for re-
appointment 
Method of appointment 
to specific cases 
Other provisions 
European 
Court of First 
Instance – 27 
judges (Statute 
of the ECJ Art 
48; EU Treaty 
Art 224) 
EU Treaty Art 223: 
‘…. They shall be 
appointed by 
common accord of 
the governments of 
the Member 
States….’ 
EU Treaty Art 224: 
‘The members of 
the Court of First 




beyond doubt and 
who possess the 




EU Treaty Art 224: 
‘…. They shall be 
appointed by 
common accord of 
the governments of 
the Member States 
for a term of six 
years….’ 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 4 
and 47: ‘The Judges may 
not hold any political or 
administrative office. They 
may not engage in any 
occupation, whether gainful 
or not, unless exemption is 
exceptionally granted by the 
Council. When taking up 
their duties, they shall give a 
solemn undertaking that, 
both during and after their 
term of office, they will 
respect the obligations 
EU Treaty Art 224: 
‘Retiring members 
shall be eligible for 
re-appointment.’ 
Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of First Instance, Art 
6: ‘With the exception of 
the President of the Court 
of First Instance and of the 
Presidents of the Chambers, 
the Judges shall rank equally 
in precedence according to 
their seniority in office. 
Where there is equal 
seniority in office, 
precedence shall be 
determined by age….’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 2 and 47: 
‘Before taking up his duties each 
Judge shall, in open court, take an 
oath to perform his duties 
impartially and conscientiously 
and to preserve the secrecy of all 
the deliberations of the Court.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 6 and 47: 
‘A Judge may be deprived of his 
office or of his right to a pension 
or other benefits in its stead only 
if, in the unanimous opinion of 
the Judges and Advocates 
 5
arising therefrom, in 
particular the duty to 
behave with integrity and 
discretion as regards the 
acceptance, after they have 
ceased to hold office, of 
certain appointments or 
benefits. Any doubt on this 
point shall be settled by 
decision of the Court.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the 
ECJ Art 5: ‘Members who 
wish to take part in an 
external activity shall 
request prior authorisation 
from the Court or Tribunal 
of which they are a 
Member. They shall 
undertake, however, to 
comply with their obligation 
to be available so as to 
devote themselves fully to 
the performance of their 
duties.’ 
Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of First Instance, Art 
10: ‘The Court of First 
Instance shall set up 
Chambers of three and of 
five Judges and a Grand 
Chamber of thirteen Judges 
and shall decide which 
Judges shall be attached to 
them.’ 
 
Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of First Instance, Art 
12: ‘The Court of First 
Instance shall lay down 
criteria by which cases are 
to be allocated among the 
Chambers.’ 
General of the Court, he no 
longer fulfils the requisite 
conditions or meets the 
obligations arising from his office. 
The Judge concerned shall not 
take part in any such 
deliberations.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 15 and 47: 
‘The Court shall remain 
permanently in session. The 
duration of the judicial vacations 
shall be determined by the Court 
with due regard to the needs of its 
business.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 18 and 47: 
‘No Judge or Advocate General 
may take part in the disposal of 
any case in which he has 
previously taken part as agent or 
adviser or has acted for one of 
the parties, or in which he has 
been called upon to pronounce as 
a member of a court or tribunal, 
of a commission of inquiry or in 
any other capacity….. If, for 
some special reason, the President 
considers that any Judge or 
Advocate General should not sit 
or make submissions in a 
particular case, he shall notify him 
accordingly. Any difficulty arising 
as to the application of this 
Article shall be settled by decision 
of the Court.’ 
 
Statute of the ECJ Art: 52: ‘The 
President of the Court of Justice 
and the President of the Court of 
First Instance shall determine, by 
common accord, the conditions 
under which officials and other 
servants attached to the Court of 
Justice shall render their services 
to the Court of First Instance to 
enable it to function.’ 
 6
 
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art 
3: ‘Members shall not accept gifts 
of any kind which might call into 
question their independence.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art 
3: ‘Members shall avoid any 
situation which may give rise to a 
conflict of interest.’ 
 
Code of Conduct of the ECJ Art 
6: ‘…. Members shall 
undertake…. that, for a period of 
three years from the date of their 
ceasing to hold office, they will 
not act – as representatives of 
parties, in either written or oral 
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Rome Statute Art 
35(1): ‘All judges 
shall be elected as 
full-time members 
of the Court….’ 
 




election to the 
Court may be made 
by any State Party 
to this Statute, and 
shall be made 
either: (i) By the 
procedure for the 
nomination of 
candidates for 
appointment to the 
highest judicial 
offices in the State 
in question; or (ii) 
By the procedure 
provided for the 
nomination of 
candidates for the 
International Court 
of Justice in the 
Statute of that 
Court. 
Nominations shall 
be accompanied by 
a statement in the 
necessary detail 
specifying how the 




Rome Statute Art 
Rome Statute Art 
36(3)(a): ‘The 
judges shall be 
chosen from 







required in their 
respective States 
for appointment to 
the highest judicial 
offices.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(3)(b): ‘Every 
candidate for 
election to the 
Court shall: (i) 
Have established 
competence in 
criminal law and 
procedure, and the 
necessary relevant 
experience, 
whether as judge, 
prosecutor, 
advocate or in 
other similar 
capacity in criminal 
proceedings; or (ii) 
Have established 
competence in 





Rome Statute Art 
36(9)(a): ‘… judges 
shall hold office for 
a term of nine 
years….’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
46(1): ‘A judge… 
shall be removed 
from office if a 
decision to this 
effect is made in 
accordance with 
paragraph 2, in 
cases where that 
person: (a) Is 
found to have 
committed serious 
misconduct or a 
serious breach of 
his or her duties 
under this 
Statute…; or (b) Is 
unable to exercise 
the functions 
required by this 
Statute.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
46(2): ‘A decision 
as to the removal 
from office of a 
judge… shall be 
made by the 
Assembly of State 
Parties, by secret 
ballot:: (a) In the 
case of a judge, by 
a two-thirds 
majority of the 
States Parties upon 
Rome Statute Art 35(1): ‘All 
judges shall be elected as 
full-time members of the 
Court and shall be available 
to serve on that basis from 
the commencement of their 
terms.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 35(3): 
‘The Presidency may, on the 
basis of the workload of the 
Court and in consultation 
with its members, decide 
from time to time to what 
extent the remaining judges 
shall be required to serve on 
a full-time basis….’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 40(1): 
‘The judges shall be 
independent in the 
performance of their 
functions.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 40(2): 
‘Judges shall not engage in 
any activity which is likely 
to interfere with their 
judicial functions or to 
affect confidence in their 
independence.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 40(3): 
‘Judges required to serve on 
a full-time basis at the seat 
of the Court shall not 
engage in any other 
occupation of a professional 
nature.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 40(4): 
Rome Statute Art 
36(9)(a): ‘… judges 
shall… not be 
eligible for re-
election.’ 
Rome Statute Art 39(1): ‘As 
soon as possible after the 
election of the judges, the 
Court shall organize itself 
into the divisions 
specified…. The assignment 
of judges to divisions shall 
be based on the nature of 
the functions to be 
performed by each division 
and the qualifications and 
experience of the judges 
elected to the Court, in such 
a way that each division 
shall contain an appropriate 
combination of expertise in 
criminal law and procedure 
and in international law. 
The Trial and Pre-Trial 
Divisions shall be 
composed predominantly of 
judges with criminal trial 
experience.’  
Rome Statute Art 41(2)(a): ‘A 
judge shall not participate in any 
case in which his or her 
impartiality might reasonably be 
doubted on any ground. A judge 
shall be disqualified from a case in 
accordance with this paragraph if, 
inter alia, that judge has 
previously been involved in any 
capacity in that case before the 
Court or in a related criminal case 
at the national level involving the 
person being investigated or 
prosecuted….’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 41(2)(c): ‘Any 
question as to the disqualification 
of a judge shall be decided by an 
absolute majority of the judges. 
The challenged judge shall be 
entitled to present his or her 
comments on the matter, but 
shall not take part in the decision.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 45: ‘Before 
taking up their respective duties 
under this Statute, the judges… 
shall each make a solemn 
undertaking in open court to 
exercise his or her respective 
functions impartially and 
conscientiously.’  
 
Rome Statute Art 49: ‘The 
judges… shall receive such 
salaries, allowances and expenses 
as may be decided upon by the 
Assembly of States Parties. These 
salaries and allowances shall not 




State Party may put 
forward one 
candidate for any 
given election….’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(4)(c): ‘The 
Assembly of State 
Parties may decide 





that event, the 
Committee’s 
composition and 
mandate shall be 
established by the 
Assembly of State 
Parties.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(6)(a): ‘The 
judges shall be 
elected by secret 
ballot at a meeting 
of the Assembly of 
States Parties 
convened for that 
purpose….’  
and the law of 
human rights, and 
extensive 
experience in a 
professional legal 
capacity which is 
relevant to the 
judicial work of the 
Court.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(4)(b): ‘Each 
State Party may put 
forward one 
candidate for any 
given election who 
need not 
necessarily be a 
national of that 
State Party but 
shall in any case by 
a national of a State 
Party.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(7): ‘No two 
judges may be 
nationals of the 
same State….’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(8)(a): ‘The 
States Parties shall, 
in the selection of 
judges, take into 
account the need, 
within the 
membership of the 
Court, for: (i) The 
representation of 
the principal legal 





(iii) A fair 
a recommendation 
by a two-thirds 
majority of the 
other judges….’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
47: ‘A judge… who 
has committed 
misconduct of a 
less serious 





Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of 
the ICC, Rule 31: 
‘Once removal 
from office has 
been pronounced, 
it shall take effect 
immediately. The 
person concerned 
shall cease to form 
part of the Court, 
including for 
unfinished cases in 
which he or she 
was taking part.’ 
 
‘Any question regarding the 
application of paragraphs 2 
and 3 shall be decided by an 
absolute majority of the 
judges. Where any such 
question concerns an 
individual judge, that judge 
shall not take part in the 
decision.’ 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of 
the ICC, Art 10(1): ‘Judges 
shall not engage in any 
extra-judicial activity that is 
incompatible with their 
judicial function or the 
efficient and timely 
functioning of the Court, or 
that may affect or may 
reasonably appear to affect 
their independence and 
impartiality. 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of 
the ICC, Art 10(2): ‘Judges 
shall not exercise any 
political function.’ 
 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the ICC, Rule 34: ‘In addition 
to the grounds set out… the 
grounds for disqualification of a 
judge… shall include, inter alia, 
the following: (a) Personal interest 
in the case…; (b) Involvement, in 
his or her private capacity, in any 
legal proceedings… in which the 
person being investigated or 
prosecuted was or is an opposing 
party; (c) Performance of 
functions, prior to taking office, 
during which he or she could be 
expected to have formed an 
opinion…; (d) Expression of 
opinions, through the 
communications media, in writing 
or in public actions, that, 
objectively, could adversely affect 
the required impartiality of the 
person concerned.’ 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of the 
ICC, Art 3(1): ‘Judges shall 
uphold the independence of their 
office and the authority of the 
Court and shall conduct 
themselves accordingly in carrying 
out their judicial functions.’ 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of the 
ICC, Art 3(2): ‘Judges shall not 
engage in any activity which is 
likely to interfere with their 
judicial functions or to affect 
confidence in their 
independence.’ 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of the 
ICC, Art 4(1): ‘Judges shall be 
impartial and ensure the 
appearance of impartiality in the 





female and male 
judges.’ 
 
Rome Statute Art 
36(8)(b): ‘States 
Parties shall also 
take into account 
the need to include 
judges with legal 
expertise on 
specific issues, 
including, but not 
limited to, violence 
against women and 
children.’  
Code of Judicial Ethics of the 
ICC, Art 4(2): ‘Judges shall avoid 
any conflict of interest, or being 
placed in a situation which might 
reasonably be perceived as giving 
rise to a conflict of interest.’ 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of the 
ICC, Art 5(1): ‘Judges shall 
conduct themselves with probity 
and integrity in accordance with 
their office, thereby enhancing 
public confidence in the 
judiciary.’ 
 
Code of Judicial Ethics of the 
ICC, Art 5(2): ‘Judges shall not 
directly or indirectly accept any 
gift, advantage, privilege or 
reward that can reasonably be 
perceived as being intended to 
influence the performance of 
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ICJ Statute Art 4: 
‘The members of 
the Court shall be 
elected by the 
General Assembly 
and by the Security 
Council from a list 
of persons 
nominated by the 





ICJ Statute Art 8: 
‘The General 




one another to 
elect the members 
of the Court.’ 
 
ICJ Statute Art 10: 
‘1. Those 
candidates who 
obtain an absolute 
majority of votes in 
the General 
Assembly and in 
the Security 
Council shall be 
considered as 
elected. 2. Any vote 
of the Security 
Council, whether 
for the election of 
judges or…, shall 
be taken without 
any distinction 
ICJ Statute Art 2: 
‘The Court shall be 




regardless of their 
nationality from 





required in their 
respective 
countries for 
appointment to the 
highest judicial 






ICJ Statute Art 
3(1): ‘The Court 
shall consist of 
fifteen members, 
no two of whom 
may be nationals of 
the same state.’ 
 
ICJ Statute Art 9: 
‘At every election, 
the electors shall 
bear in mind not 
only that the 




ICJ Statute Art 
13(1): ‘The 
members of the 
Court shall be 
elected for nine 
years….’ 
 
ICJ Statute Art 
18(1): ‘No member 
of the Court can be 
dismissed unless, in 
the unanimous 
opinion of the 
other members, he 
has ceased to fulfill 
the required 
conditions.’   
ICJ Statute Art 16: ‘1. No 
member of the Court may 
exercise any political or 
administrative function, or 
engage in any other 
occupation of a professional 
nature. 2. Any doubt on this 
point shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court.’  
 
ICJ Statute Art 23(3): 
‘Members of the Court shall 
be bound, unless they are 
on leave or prevented from 
attending by illness or other 
serious reasons duly 
explained to the President, 
to hold themselves 
permanently at the disposal 
of the Court.’ 
ICJ Statute Art 
13(1): ‘The 
members of the 
Court… may be re-
elected….’ 
ICJ Statute Art 26: ‘1. The 
Court may from time to 
time form on or more 
chambers, composed of 
three or more judges as the 
Court may determine…. 2. 
The Court may at any time 
form a chamber for dealing 
with a particular case. The 
number of judges to 
constitute such a chamber 
shall be determined by the 
Court with the approval of 
the parties.’  
 
Rules of the Court, Art 
18(1): ‘Elections to all 
Chambers shall take place 
by secret ballot. The 
Members of the Court 
obtaining the largest 
number of votes 
constituting a majority of 
the Members of the Court 
composing it at the time of 
the election shall be 
declared elected.’ 
ICJ Statute Art 17: ‘1. No 
member of the Court may act as 
agent, counsel, or advocate in any 
case…. 3. Any doubt on this 
point shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court.’ 
 
ICJ Statute Art 20: ‘Every 
member of the Court shall, before 
taking up his duties, make a 
solemn declaration in open court 
that he will exercise his powers 
impartially and conscientiously.’ 
 
ICJ Statute Art 23(1): ‘The Court 
shall remain permanently in 
session, except during the judicial 
vacations, the dates and duration 
of which shall be fixed by the 
Court.’  
 
ICJ Statute Art 24: “…. 2. If the 
President considers that for some 
special reason one of the 
members of the Court should not 
sit in a particular case, he shall 
give him notice accordingly. 3. If 
in any such case the member of 
the Court and the President 
disagree, the matter shall be 
settled by the decision of the 
Court.’  
 
ICJ Statute Art 32: ‘1. Each 
member of the Court shall receive 
an annual salary…. 5. These 
salaries, allowances, and 
compensation shall be fixed by 
the General Assembly. They may 
not be decreased during the term 





members of the 
Security Council. 
3….’ 
required, but also 
that in the body as 
a whole the 
representation of 
the main forms of 
civilization and of 
the principal legal 
systems of the 
world should be 
assured.’ 
by the General Assembly shall fix 
the conditions under which 
retirement pensions may be given 
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serve on any 
one case (DSU 
Art 17(1)). 
DSU Art 17(2): 
‘The DSB shall 
appoint persons to 
serve on the 
Appellate Body….’ 







expertise in law, 
international trade 
and the subject 





DSU Art 17(3): 
‘…. The Appellate 
Body membership 
shall be broadly 
representative of 
membership in the 
WTO….’ 
DSU Art 17(2): 
‘The DSB shall 
appoint persons to 
serve on the 
Appellate Body for 
a four-year term… 
However, the 
terms of three of 
the seven persons 
appointed 
immediately after 
the entry into force 
of the WTO 
Agreement shall 
expire at the end of 
two years, to be 
determined by lot.  
Vacancies shall be 
filled as they 
arise….’ 
DSU Art 17(3): ‘…. All 
persons serving on the 
Appellate Body shall be 
available at all times and on 
short notice, and shall stay 
abreast of dispute 
settlement activities and 
other relevant activities of 
the WTO.  They shall not 
participate in the 
consideration of any 
disputes that would create a 
direct or indirect conflict of 
interest.’ 
DSU Art 17(2): 
‘The DSB shall 
appoint persons to 
serve on the 
Appellate Body for 
a four-year term, 




DSU Art 17(1): ‘…. Persons 
serving on the Appellate 
Body shall serve in rotation. 
Such rotation shall be 
determined in the working 
procedures of the Appellate 
Body.’ 
DSU Art 17(3): ‘The Appellate 
Body shall comprise persons… 
unaffiliated with any 
government….’ 
 
DSU Art 17(3) ‘They shall not 
participate in the consideration of 
any disputes that would create a 
direct or indirect conflict of 
interest.’ 
WTO panels – 
three members 
unless parties 
agree to have 
five (DSU Art 
8(5)). 
NA DSU Art 8(1) – 








who have served 
on or presented a 
case to a panel, 
served as a 
NA NA NA DSU Art 8(6): ‘The 
Secretariat shall propose 
nominations for the panel 
to the parties to the dispute. 
The parties to the dispute 
shall not oppose 
nominations except for 
compelling reasons.’ 
 
DSU Art 8(7): ‘If there is no 
agreement on the panelists 
within 20 days after the date 
of the establishment of a 
DSU Art 8(2) ‘Panel members 
should be selected with a view to 
ensuring the independence of the 
members, a sufficiently diverse 
background and a wide spectrum 
of experience.’ 
 
DSU Art 8(3): Citizens of 
Members whose governments are 
parties to the dispute or third 
parties… shall not serve on a 
panel concerned with that 
dispute, unless the parties to the 
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representative of a 
Member or of a 
contracting party to 
GATT 1947 or as a 
representative to 
the Council or 
Committee of any 
covered agreement 
or its predecessor 
agreement, or in 
the Secretariat, 
taught or published 
on international 
trade law or policy, 
or served as a 
senior trade policy 
official of a 
Member.’ 
 
DSU Art 8(10): 
‘When a dispute is 
between a 
developing country 
Member and a 
developed country 
Member the panel 
shall, if the 
developing country 
Member so 
requests, include at 
least one panelist 





Procedures for the 
GATS Art 3: 







have experience in 
issues related to the 
panel, at the request of 
either party, the Director-
General, in consultation 
with the Chairman of the 
DSB and the Chairman of 
the relevant Council or 
Committee, shall determine 
the composition of the 
panel by appointing the 
panelists whom the 
Director-General considers 
most appropriate…, after 
consulting with the parties 
to the dispute….’  
 
 
dispute agree otherwise.’ 
 
DSU Art 8(4): ‘To assist in the 
selection of panelists, the 
Secretariat shall maintain an 
indicative list of governmental 
and non-governmental individuals 
possessing the qualifications 
outlined in paragraph 1, from 
which panelists may be drawn as 
appropriate…. Members may 
periodically suggest names of 
governmental and non-
governmental individuals for 
inclusion on the indicative list….’ 
 
DSU Art 8(9): ‘Panelists shall 
serve in their individual capacities 
and not as government 
representatives, nor as 
representatives of any 
organization.  Members shall 
therefore not give them 
instructions nor seek to influence 
them as individuals with regard to 
matters before a panel.’ 
 
DSU Art 9(3) ‘If more than one 
panel is established to examine 
the complaints related to the 
same matter, to the greatest 
extent possible the same persons 
shall serve as panelists on each of 
the separate panels and the 
timetable for the panel process in 
such disputes shall be 
harmonized.’ – see CME/ Lauder  
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General Agreement 
on Trade in 
Services and/or 
trade in services, 
including 
associated 
regulatory 
matters…..  
 
 
